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ABSTRACT 
Increasing numbers of foreign firms are holding cross-border IPOs in attempts to raise 
capital in markets outside of their home nation. Within the United States cross-border 
IPOs consistently experience greater amounts of underpricing than domestic IPOs. This 
paper examines the effects of SIC industry classifications on cross-border and domestic 
IPO underpricing from 2004-2010. Analysis demonstrates that in various industries, SIC 
classification has a significant impact upon underpricing in comparison to other 
industries. While in other industries, significance is solely exhibited through the differing 
impacts of domestic and cross-border IPOs, within the industry itself, upon underpricing. 
The most significant industry effect is seen in high-technology industries which display a 
significant impact on underpricing on both the inter-industry and intra-industry level. 
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I. Introduction 
 Within the last two decades, international investment opportunities have 
flourished as an increasing number of countries eliminate or ease restrictive legal barriers 
for foreign investment. Simultaneously, an increasingly large number of firms have 
looked outside the borders of their home countries in search of new opportunities to raise 
capital. This investment is primarily done through initial public offerings (IPOs) held in 
foreign markets, also known as cross-border IPOs. As cross-border IPOs become more 
common, severe underpricing of these international IPOs almost always occurs. 
Researchers and economists have examined this trend and the rationale behind such an 
occurrence. Many previous studies examined intra-industry effects but no previous 
studies have expounded on the impact of SIC industry classification, and thus the 
overarching industry characteristics, upon IPO underpricing (Akhigbe, et al., 2003).  
This study examines international firms holding an initial public offering on a US 
exchange, defining initial public offering to mean that the firm is not listed on any other 
exchange at the time of the cross-border IPO. IPO underpricing will be measured as the 
percentage difference between the company’s offer price and the price at the end of the 
first trading day. In addition, the following control variables will be analyzed in attempts 
to control for possible investor exposure to a individual firm’s IPO rather than exposure 
to an industry as a whole: size of the initial public offering, overhang percentage, number 
of days since the last domestic IPO within the industry, how many of the top five firms 
within the industry (as determined by net sales) are based in the US, number of 
employees within the firm, and net sales of the individual firms.  
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This paper will proceed as follows: Section II is a review of the academic 
literature on IPO underpricing and the theories being applied to cross-border IPO 
underpricing. Section III describes the data and data collection process. Section IV 
illustrates the methods used to analyze the data. Section V provides and discusses the 
results of the econometric analysis. Section VI concludes the paper and presents areas for 
potential future studies. 
 
II. Literature Review 
  The concept of IPO underpricing has been thoroughly examined with the primary 
theories of IPO underpricing grouped under four broad categories: asymmetric 
information, institutional, signaling, and behavioral. The significant difference in foreign 
and domestic IPO underpricing has led scholars to begin applying the traditional 
explanations for domestic IPO underpricing to cross-border IPOs. In a study examining 
foreign and domestic IPOs between 1990-1993, Francis, Hasan, and Li (2001) found that 
foreign IPOs experienced underpricing of 13.79% compared to underpricing of 8.75% 
experienced by domestic IPOs. The IPOs were matched based upon SIC Code and 
issuing year. The disparity between foreign and domestic IPO underpricing has fluctuated 
throughout the years, but a notable difference still exists between the two today. 
 Information asymmetry is often pointed to as the source behind much of the 
cross-border IPO underpricing trend. This theory assumes that one of the parties involved 
in an IPO transaction, the issuing firm, the underwriting bank, or the potential investors, 
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knows more than the other parties. However, while various studies have examined 
differing cultural, financial, and geographical factors impacting both IPO underpricing 
and IPO aftermarket performance, very little has been done to categorize this information 
asymmetry on an industry-wide basis. (Grinnblatt and Kloharju, 2001; Bruner et al., 
2000; Ejara and Ghosh, 2004).  The focus of these previous studies has been to 
distinguish specific variables affecting the discrepancy in underpricing between domestic 
IPOs and foreign IPOs. A study performed by Grinnblatt and Keloharju (2001) on 
Finnish investors shows that stocks originating from countries with geographical 
proximity to, a common language with, or a shared border with Finland performed better.  
As most of these studies have concentrated on country-specific or firm-specific variables, 
my study will contribute to the recent upsurge in literature by examining industry-wide 
variables which may be affecting cross border IPO underpricing.  
IPO underpricing can stem from investors having a different set of information or 
from the IPO management team having a different set of information. Hurusti and Maula 
(2007) displayed that pre-ownership and management by foreign investors has a 
significant impact of the underpricing of a cross-border IPO. Firms with pre-IPO 
ownership by foreign investors or whose management teams had previous experience 
with international IPOs displayed less underpricing due to increased international 
experience and exposure. Thus, familiarity on both sides of the IPO equation diminishes 
the amount of underpricing experienced during a cross-border IPO. 
 Institutional factors can also have a significant impact on the quantity of cross-
border IPOs occurring within a given country as well as the performance of those cross-
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border IPOs with regards to underpricing. Moore, Bell, and Filatotchev’s (2010) study 
demonstrates the importance of investor protection in country of origin and exchange 
listing requirements in the destination country on IPO underpricing in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom. A greater level of investor protection as defined by the 
La Porta’s index, which classifies the level of investor protection through the 
enforcement of regulations and laws, diminishes underpricing. In addition, IPOs 
occurring on exchanges in the United States with stricter listing requirements showed less 
underpricing than IPOs occurring on similar exchanges in the United Kingdom. These 
types of bureaucratic variables can have a significant impact on underpricing of domestic 
and cross-border IPOs before investor familiarity even becomes a factor. 
Another explanation of IPO underpricing is the information signaling hypothesis. 
Ritter (1991) argues that firms may choose to go public when investors are “irrationally 
over-optimistic” about the future of certain industries. The subsequent dramatic increase 
in share price during the IPO would promote a favorable signal for not only the company 
itself but also for the industry as a whole. Ritter’s research has been further expanded  in 
a study by Francis, et al. (2010) to include evidence from foreign IPOs in attempts to 
examine why companies are willing to leave substantial amounts of money on the table in 
order to signal high investor expectations. Francis, et al. discovered that signaling theory 
is primarily important for cross-border IPOs relating to the underpricing of companies 
originating in segmented financial markets. Firms from segmented financial markets face 
higher information asymmetry and thus have a greater need to access external  capital 
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markets. The trend among these firms is to issue large amounts of seasoned equity shortly 
after their initial public offering; therefore, they are willing to leave money on the table in 
order to signal high investor expectations to the market so that their seasoned equity 
offerings become a more profitable endeavor. 
 Regardless of a firms’ potential signaling, it is proven that investor behavior, 
whether rational or irrational, is one of the most significant factors affecting cross-border 
IPO underpricing.  Investors generally do not invest heavily in foreign entities, including 
cross-border IPOs. Most existing studies reveal that investors primarily invest in local 
markets due to unfamiliarity with foreign assets, also known as home bias. Kang and 
Stulz (1997) suggest that home bias leads Japanese investors who do chose to invest in 
foreign entities to be highly selective in which industries and firms they choose to invest 
in, rather than selecting a broad market portfolio of investments. In particular, investors 
over allocate portfolio space to manufacturing industries, large firms,  and firms with low 
leverage and low unsystematic risk. These were industries and qualities that were either 
familiar to the sample of investors as demonstrated by the prominent industries within 
Japan, or had been proven to be correlated with high stock performance on the domestic 
market.  
 While it is difficult to identify what exact qualities contribute to familiarity, it is 
known that individual investors will choose to invest in organizations, industries, and 
firm qualities that they have increased exposure to or are familiar with. Huberman (2001)  
proved that shareholders of regional bell operating companies tend to live in the area 
served by the company. Even though other regional bell operating companies were 
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performing better investors continued to demonstrate a geographic bias due to their 
familiarity with the company in their region. Likewise, Massa and Simonov (2006) 
demonstrated that Swedish investors selected stocks closely related with their personal 
non-financial income. Individuals were using their geographic and professional 
affiliations as a no cost, efficient source of information regarding investments. These 
familiarity-based investments were allowing the investors to achieve higher returns than 
they otherwise would have if they attempted to diversify or hedge their investments 
through independent information sources. 
Akhigbe et al. (2003) examined the effects of an IPO upon rival firms within an 
industry, but their results were largely inconclusive. They found that the lack of intra-
industry reaction was due to the offsetting influences of information effects and 
competitive effects. Although their results determined the intra-industry effect to be 
insignificant, their examination of the variables composing what they deemed 
“informational effects” and “competitive effects” proved that certain factors influencing 
an industry as a whole can have an impact upon the cumulative average returns of firms 
within that industry. Significant informational effects including industry regulation and 
length of time between industry IPOs  produced a positive reaction upon rival firms 
within industries, but their impact was negated by negative competitive effects such as 
large IPOs in competitive industries or classification as a high-technology industry. Their 
research posed the question of whether these industry effects may impact IPO 
underpricing of firms within a specific industry.  
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There is existing research distinguishing cross-border IPO underpricing and 
domestic IPO underpricing, but the research on testable explanations for the underpricing 
is limited because the number of cross-border IPOs was minimal until the early-1990s.  
Very few of the studies examining this phenomenon incorporate industry classifications 
and almost none of the studies conduct industry-wide analysis. Identifying patterns in 
industry underpricing between foreign and domestic IPOs may provide an arbitrage 
opportunity for investors to take advantage of the discrepancy in IPO underpricing within 
particular industries.  This paper examines how industry-wide characteristics influence 
the underpricing of cross-border IPOs as opposed to domestic IPOs. 
  
III. Data Collection and Description 
 This study includes all cross-border IPOs occurring in the United States from 
2004-2010, as well as domestic IPOs from comparable US-based companies. Within the 
context of this study, “comparable” is being defined as identically matching SIC codes 
within the designated time frame. The IPOs included within this study, both cross-border 
and domestic, were identified through the Hoovers database as having occurred between 
2004-2010 and  include listings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and Nasdaq Exchange. All data pertaining to stock pricings, 
company information, and IPO specifics were acquired through the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) while all information relating to industry statistics or data is 
from Hoovers. 
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 The data set includes the initial offer price of the IPO and the share price at 
closing on the first day of trading. From this data I calculated the underpricing percent 
which will act as the dependent variable for all my regressions. I also calculated the 
overhang percent as the number of shares issued in the IPO as a percent of total shares 
outstanding on the date of issuance. In addition, all American depository receipts (ADRs) 
were eliminated from the data. ADRs enable investors to purchase shares of a foreign 
company through a depository bank rather than allowing investors direct trading access 
through a stock exchange. Since many companies issuing ADRs are already listed on an 
exchange in their home country, they were eliminated from the sample. Penny stocks 
(IPOs with an issue price of under five dollars) and companies who have gone bankrupt 
or been privatized since their issue date were also eliminated from the study due to the 
lack of available data. In addition, any cross-border IPOs without a domestic IPO within 
the same SIC code were eliminated from the sample set of data.  
 I also chose to eliminate SIC codes in which the only cross-border IPOs were 
from companies listing Bermuda, the Bahamas, or the Cayman Islands as their country of 
origin. Most of these firms have incorporated to these locales for tax purposes alone and 
are often domestic firms simply using these foreign locales as their IPO country of origin. 
They are therefore not representative of typical cross-border IPOs and may skew the final 
results. However, the SIC codes in which the sample of cross-border IPOs included IPOs 
originating in Bermuda, the Bahamas, or the Cayman Islands in addition to cross-border 
IPOs from other foreign locales were left in the sample data. As long as other 
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international firms are also conducting IPOs within a particular industry I cannot assume 
that the firms listing Bermuda, the Bahamas, or the Cayman Islands as their country of 
origin are representing firms incorporating for tax purposes alone but may instead be 
actual firms originating from and operating within the designated country. This is in 
agreement with many previous studies which have also eliminated these issues for the 
aforementioned reasons (Moore et al., 2010). After all the data had been cleaned, I was 
left with a sample of 93 cross-border IPOs and 219 domestic IPOs spanning 42 different 
industries. It should however be noted that a potential flaw in my data set is that I 
composed it manually so there is the possibility of human error.  
 
IV. Methodology 
 We use the following empirical model to analyze the data and explain the effect 
of the following variables on IPO underpricing. The variables of primary interest are SIC 
and SIC*Foreign as the intent of this study is to examine the effect of SIC classification 
upon underpricing; all other variables are utilized as control variables.   
UNDERP = β0 + β1OVERH + β2SALES + β3EMP + β4OFFERA +                    (1) 
β5TOP +β6DAYS + β7DATE + β8US + β9SIC + β10SIC*US + ε   
where: 
UNDERPRICING = the underpricing of a firm’s IPO as measured by the  
difference between the offer price and the trading price at the end of the 
first day 
 OVERHANG = the amount of overhang resulting from the IPO, measured as the  
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number of shares offered in the IPO as a percent of the firm’s total shares 
outstanding at the time the IPO registration was filed with the securities 
and exchange commission 
 SALES = the dollar amount in millions of net sales recorded for the most recent  
year prior to the IPO 
 EMPLOYEES = the number of employees  
 OFFER AMOUNT  = the size of the IPO in millions of dollars 
 TOP 5 US = the number of US based firms within the industry’s top five  
companies as measured by sales in millions of dollars 
 DAYS = the number of days since the most recent US IPO within the industry 
 DATE = the date of the IPO 
 FOREIGN = 1 if the IPO firm has filed with an international location as their  
country of origin, 0 if the firm filed with the US as their country of origin. 
This variable is not included in the regression itself to avoid 
multicollinearity in the results due to its presence in the interaction term 
SIC*FOREIGN 
 SIC = the four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code assigned to the  
firm followed by four zeros, representing the industry effect of all broad 
characteristics applying to all firms within the industry as a whole. This is 
a categorical variable with a level for each individual industry dummy 
variable 
 SIC*FOREIGN = an interaction term calculated by multiplying the foreign  
variable by the SIC Variable 
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V. Results and Analysis 
Table III provides a correlation matrix for the regression variables while Table IV 
provides the summary statistics and correlation analysis for the 312 observations included 
in the model. The correlations between variables seem to be generally low, suggesting 
that multicollinearity should not be a significant problem in my regressions. 
The results from my regression are displayed in Table VII and show that most 
control variables are not statistically significant. Out of the control variables, only days 
since last domestic IPO is significant on the ten percent level and displays a negative 
relationship with IPO underpricing. This relationship signifies that as the number of days 
since the last domestic IPO within the industry increases, the underpricing of the IPO will 
decrease by 0.00002 percent. This may be explained by the fact that when a domestic 
IPO has not occurred within a particular industry for a significant period of time, 
investors do more research prior to the IPO due to their lack of recent familiarity with 
IPOs in that industry. When investors are more informed, some of the information 
asymmetry between the underwriters and investors is eliminated and thus the IPO is less 
likely to demonstrate underpricing.   
Using the above model, I calculated the impact of the given variables upon IPO 
underpricing and find that nine out of 42 industries within the variable SIC have an 
impact upon IPO underpricing which is statistically different from all other industries at 
the five percent level: Miscellaneous publishing, Commercial printing, Chemical 
preparations, Computer peripheral equipment, Wireline telecommunications equipment, 
Telecommunications equipment, Opthalmic goods, Sporting and athletic goods, and 
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Water utilities. Eight of the nine industries have a positive relationship with underpricing, 
meaning that the particular industry has greater underpricing than the underpricing 
experienced by all other industries. In contrast, Chemical preparations is the only 
industry with a negative relationship with underpricing. The coefficient for this industry 
is -0.1523634 signifying that the IPOs within the chemical preparations industry are, on 
average, 15.24 percent less underpriced than IPOs in all other industries. However, six 
out of the nine industries only contain sample data from one cross-border IPO and one or 
two corresponding domestic IPOs meaning that the results may not be entirely 
representative of IPOs within the industries. The other three industries, Computer 
peripheral equipment, Wireline telecommunications equipment, and Telecommunications 
equipment, all have more than four observations in their respective samples so their 
results may be more representatively consistent.  
My primary examination will be of the interaction variable SIC*Foreign. I find 
that for 16 out of the 42 industries within this variable, cross-border IPOs and domestic 
IPOs have statistically different underpricing. This variable interacts each individual SIC 
code with the binary variable, foreign, to demonstrate the relationship of IPO 
underpricing to both cross-border and domestic IPOs within a given industry.  The results 
of my regression denote 16 occurrences, categorized by SIC code, as statistically 
significant. These occurrences signify that within a particular SIC code, cross-border and 
domestic IPOs have significantly different impacts on underpricing. Among the 
significant occurrences, ten have positive coefficients and six have negative coefficients. 
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A positive coefficient signifies that underpricing for a foreign IPO in that industry is, on 
average, greater than the underpricing for a domestic IPO in that industry. In contrast, a 
negative coefficient means that a foreign IPO within that industry will have the less 
underpricing than a domestic IPO within the industry. The difference in underpricing will 
be quantified by the numerical amount of the coefficient. 
 The positive relationship with underpricing demonstrated by ten of the SIC codes 
is consistent with prior literature regarding foreign IPOs displaying greater underpricing 
than their domestic counterparts.  There is no discernable pattern or grouping to be made 
among the significant SIC codes as the industries range from information retrieval 
services to plastic materials and resins. Within this sample of positive relationships, it is 
also worth noting that the number of observations per SIC varies greatly with a minimum 
of two and a maximum of eight. There are four SIC codes with only two observations, 
meaning that only one cross-border IPO and one domestic IPO occurred within that 
industry during the designated time period of 2004-2010. SIC codes with only two or 
three observations in the sample data are likely to be a bit biased due to the isolated 
nature of the data and will not necessarily be an accurate portrayal of the relationship 
between IPO underpricing and cross-border IPOs. 
 The negative relationship with underpricing demonstrated by six of the SIC codes 
is contrary to general statistics regarding cross-border IPO underpricing. However three 
of the six industries are generally defined as high-tech industries within the broader 
computer and telecommunications industries, based upon total R&D as a percent of sales, 
which may explain the negative relationship. Historically the most well known and 
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successful high-tech computer and telecommunications production and development has 
been concentrated in Asia or other foreign locales. In addition, technology related firms 
are more likely to have alliance, business partners, or foreign stake-holders outside of 
their country of origin. These general trends may cause a reverse home bias with regards 
to cross-border IPOs in high-tech industries in which the foreign companies exhibit less 
underpricing than the domestic ones due to investor’s high performance expectations for 
or familiarity with foreign technology related companies.  
 The other three SIC codes which have a negative relationship with underpricing 
cannot be classified as technology related industries but may instead simply be unreliable 
results. All three industries only have two observations, a cross-border IPO and a 
corresponding domestic IPO within the same industry. As previously stated, this lack of 
observations in my sample may mean that the significance of the results may not be 
representing an accurate depiction of the normal relationship between a particular 
industry’s domestic and foreign IPOs and underpricing. 
 Overall, the most significant impact on underpricing will be exhibited by the 
industries in which both the SIC variable and the SIC*Foreign variable prove to be 
statistically significant. In the case that both variables show significance, then the 
industry as a whole has significantly different underpricing than average underpricing 
experienced by all other industries and within the industry itself there is a significant 
difference between domestic and cross-border IPO underpricing. In the case that the SIC 
variable is significant but the SIC*Foreign variable is not, it suggests that the average 
industry underpricing is significantly different from all the average underpricing of all 
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other industries, but within the industry itself the difference between domestic and cross-
border IPO underpricing is not statistically significant. The reverse is true in the case that 
the SIC*Foreign variable is significant but the SIC variable is not. Examination of the 
results from my primary regression in Table VII yields seven industries with significant 
SIC and SIC*Foreign variables. However, since this analysis is comparing a 
compounding effect across two variables, I ran a second regression using only SIC codes 
with 4 or more observations to ensure more robust results.  
 The second regression demonstrates that three out of 21 industries have 
significant results in both the SIC and SIC*Foreign variables: Computer peripheral 
equipment, Wireline telecommunications equipment, and Telecommunications 
equipment. Table V compares the results from my base regression (1) and this additional 
regression (2) which sets a minimum on observations per SIC code. All three of the 
industries have positive relationships on the industry level but negative relationships on 
the foreign/domestic level. This signifies that all three industries display greater 
underpricing compared to the average underpricing of all other industries, yet within the 
industry itself the foreign IPOs experience less underpricing than the domestic IPOs. All 
three of these industries are also classified as high-technology related industries implying 
that they are industries with high potential for growth and high risk to reward metrics. 
The high growth potential often means that investors have high expectations for the 
performance of this stock. The high level of investor expectations may increase IPO 
underpricing by artificially inflating the stock price during the first day of trading.  
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Therefore, it is not unusual to expect these industries to demonstrate greater underpricing 
than the average underpricing of all other industries. 
 
Robustness Testing 
 The events of the financial crisis from late 2007 to early 2009 caused a drastic 
decline in the number of domestic and cross-border IPOs occurring in the United States 
as seen in Table II. In addition IPO underpricing and average first day returns during 
2008 were significantly lower than the years ex-ante and ex-post financial crisis. Due to 
this shock in underpricing, I test the robustness of my results by performing a third 
regression in which IPOs occurring from August 2007-January 2009 are eliminated from 
the sample data. The deletion of these IPOs resulted in certain industries being omitted 
from the sample data because the only foreign or domestic IPO for a given industry 
occurred within the time period surrounding the financial crisis. Also, the control 
variables DATE (IPO date) and DAYS (Days since last domestic IPO within the 
industry) were dropped from the regression because of the break in chronological data. 
UNDERP = β0 + β1OVERH + β2SALES + β3EMP + β4OFFERA +         (3) 
β5TOP + β7US + β8SIC + β9SIC*US + ε    
 Table VI presents the results of this regression compared to the results of our 
initial regression. The elimination of financial crisis data resulted in the control variable 
OFFER AMOUNT becoming significant at the ten percent level and the industry Process 
control instruments within the variable SIC*Foreign becoming significant at the five 
percent level. Certain variables and industries, such as the control variable DAYS, were 
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removed from the regression (3) data set and thus could no longer test for significance. 
However, other than the variables which were removed from the regression all industries 
within the SIC*Foreign variable continued to be statistically significant once the data 
relating to the financial crisis was removed from the sample set. The continuity among 
the data between the two regressions suggests that my initial results are fairly robust and 
the financial crisis did not significantly skew the significance of my results. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the effect of SIC industry classifications on cross-border 
and domestic IPO underpricing from 2004-2010. Using control and interaction variables, 
I performed econometric analysis to determine which industries had a significant impact 
upon IPO underpricing. This paper finds that various industries, as classified by four-
digit SIC codes, have a significant impact on the underpricing of initial public offerings 
for both domestic and foreign firms within the given industry. In addition, the number of 
days since the last domestic IPO in a given industry has a negative impact upon IPO 
underpricing. This indicates that IPOs occurring shortly after a domestic IPO within the 
same industry are more likely to have significant underpricing than those after a period of 
dormancy.  
While many industries have a significant impact at either the cross industry level 
or the intra-industry level between domestic and cross-border IPOs, only a few show 
continuous significance within both areas. Most predominantly, investment in the high-
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technology industries of computer peripheral equipment, Wireline telecommunications 
equipment, and Telecommunications equipment may yield the most profitable results. 
These industries demonstrate the most significant results on both the cross-industry and 
intra-industry level. While the exact difference cannot be quantified these industries 
exhibit greater underpricing on average than all other industries meaning that their end of 
first day trading price is much greater than their initial offer price. In addition, domestic 
IPOs display greater underpricing than the cross-border IPOs within these industries. An 
arbitrage opportunity may exist if investors chose to invest at the initial offer price of 
domestic IPOs within these high-technology industries. 
This paper also opens several other areas for potential study. Obtaining a data set 
spanning a greater period of time may be advisable in order to provide a more 
comprehensive study of industry. Due to the rarity of IPOs being issued in certain 
industries, many industries were excluded from my study because only a domestic or a 
cross-border IPO occurred within the industry during my defined time period while one 
of each was required for inclusion in the sample data. It would also be interesting to 
expand my research to other international markets in order to see if the same conclusions 
are held when US firms are no longer the domestic IPOs but instead constitute a portion 
of the cross-border IPOs.  
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Appendix 
Table I: SIC Codes Included in Data Set & Number of IPOs Observed per SIC Code 
SIC Code Samples SIC Industry Name SIC Code Samples  SIC Industry Name 
13820000 3 Oil & gas exploration 
Services 
48120000 3 Radiotelephone 
communication 
20850000 2 Distillers and blended 
liquors 
48130000 6 Telephone 
communication, 
except radio 
27410000 3 Miscellaneous 
publishing 
48330000 2 Television 
broadcasting stations 
27590000 2 Commercial printing 48990000 7 Communication 
services 
28210000 3 Plastics materials and 
resins 
49410000 2 Water utilities 
28340000 44 Pharmaceutical 
preparations 
51710000 3 Petroleum bulk 
stations and terminals 
28360000 15 Biological products, 
except diagnostic 
55410000 2 Gasoline service 
stations 
28990000 2 Chemical preparations 55990000 2 Automotive dealers 
35590000 4 Special industry 
machinery 
58120000 9 Eating places 
35770000 5 Computer peripheral 
equipment 
59120000 2 Drug stores and 
proprietary stores 
36610000 5 Wireline 
telecommunications 
equipment 
64110000 3 Insurance agents, 
brokers, and service 
36630000 4 Telecommunications 
equipment 
65310000 5 Real estate agents 
and managers 
36740000 34 Semiconductors and 
related devices 
67260000 5 Investment offices 
38230000 2 Process control 
instruments 
70110000 3 Hotels and motels 
38410000 12 Surgical and medical 
instruments 
73120000 2 Outdoor advertising 
services 
38450000 13 Electromedical 
equipment 
73710000 9 Custom computer 
programming 
services 
38510000 2 Opthalmic goods 73720000 38 Prepackaged software 
39490000 2 Sporting and athletic 
goods 
73750000 8 Information retrieval 
services 
44120000 21 Deep sea foreign 
transportation of freight 
73890000 11 Business services 
45120000 4 Air transportation, 
scheduled 
82990000 4 Schools and 
educational services 
47240000 2 Travel agencies 89990000 2 Services 
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Table II. Market Share of Foreign Companies among US Listing, 2004-2010 
 
Year  Number of IPOs Domestic Foreign  % Foreign 
2004 39 33 6 15.38% 
2005 41 31 10 24.39% 
2006 62 44 18 29.03% 
2007 76 53 23 30.26% 
2008 8 6 2 25.00% 
2009 25 19 6 24.00% 
2010 61 33 28 45.90% 
 
Table III: Correlation Matrix for base regression (1) 
 
OFFERA SALES EMP OVERH TOP DAYS DATE FOREIGN SIC 
OFFERA 1.0000 
SALES 0.5873 1.0000 
EMP 0.4631 0.5182 1.0000 
OVERH 0.0658 -0.1006 -0.0449 1.0000 
TOP 
-0.0998 -0.1018 -0.0746 -0.0560 1.0000 
DAYS 0.0988 0.1018 0.1611 0.0286 -0.0769 1.0000 
DATE 0.0597 -0.0948 0.0336 0.2609 0.0913 -0.0157 1.0000 
FOREIGN 0.0844 -0.0035 0.1456 0.3048 -0.2024 0.1339 0.1820 1.0000 
SIC  0.1741 0.1315 0.2399 0.1696 0.3624 0.1341 0.1513 0.0850 1.0000 
 
 
Table IV: Summary Statistics of base regression (1) 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Dev. Min  Max 
Underpricing % 312 .1117277 .1982499 -.2954545 1 
Offer Amount 312 165.1917 229.3064 4.5 1875.5 
Sales 312 530.678 1865.807 0 29321 
Employees 312 2261.429 5461.585 3 45000 
SIC Code 312 4.78e+07 1.81e+07 1.38e+07 9.00e+07 
Overhang % 312 .3374193 .2283975 .0132179 1 
Top 5 in 
Industry US 
based? 
312 1.512821 1.341819 0 4 
Days since last 
industry IPO 
312 617.0609 1329.838 0 18940 
Date of IPO 312 17351.65 728.4094 16071 18613 
Foreign  312 .2980769 .4581483 0 1 
 
23 
 
Table V: Comparative Descriptive Statistics of Significant Results 
 
(1) (2) Minimum 4 observations Per SIC Code 
SIC SIC*Foreign SIC SIC*Foreign 
27410000 0.2035** 
(0.10193) 
35590000 0.2396*** 
(0.0564) 
 
 
27590000 0.1278** 
(0.12780) 
27590000 1 0.0955*** 
(0.015181) 
35770000 0.3765*** 
(0.09414) 
35770000 1 -0.3443*** 
(0.121149) 
  28210000 1 0.2670*** 
(0.050187) 
36610000 0.2882*** 
(0.08129) 
36610000 1 -0.4004*** 
(0.076982) 
28990000 -0.1523** 
(0.07404) 
 36630000 0.3350*** 
(0.03398) 
36630000 1 -0.4066*** 
(0.022978) 
35770000 0.3084*** 
(0.11579) 
35770000 1 -0.3341*** 
(0.127171) 
36740000 0.1432*** 
(0.05537) 
 
 
36610000 0.2143** 
(0.10346) 
36610000 1 -0.4042*** 
(0.082064) 
38410000 0.1694* 
(0.09379) 
 
 
36630000 0.2697*** 
(0.07124) 
36630000 1 -0.4026*** 
(0.022021) 
  48990000 1 0.1845** 
(0.079248) 
38510000 0.1462** 
(0.07316) 
38510000 1 -0.0605** 
(0.026025) 
  58120000 1 0.2496* 
(0.144179) 
39490000 0.3337*** 
(0.06704) 
39490000 1 0.1391*** 
(0.023193) 
73720000 0.0964** 
(0.04661) 
 
 
  47240000 1 0.9436*** 
(0.046182) 
  73750000 1 0.6395*** 
(0.122584) 
  48330000 1 0.2484*** 
(0.040432) 
82990000 0.1816*** 
(0.04505)   
  48990000 1 0.1871** 
(0.075458) 
  
  
49410000 0.4517*** 
(0.06796) 
49410000 1 -0.4634*** 
(0.074203) 
Days -0.00002** 
(0.00002)   
  51710000 1 0.1210* 
(0.066738) 
Constant 0.29431 
(0.31313)   
  55410000 1 -0.3043* 
(0.168932) 
Observations 249 
  
  64110000 1 0.5876*** 
(0.048869) 
R2 0.2611 
  
  70110000 1 0.2081* 
(0.118975) 
  
  
  73750000 1 0.6575*** 
(0.125901)  
 
  
        
Days -0.00002* 
(9.05e-06)    
 
  
Constant 0.25584 
(0.34771)    
 
  
Observations 312 
   
 
  
R2 0.3506 
 
  
 
  
 
*** denotes 1% confidence, ** denotes 5% confidence, * denotes 10% confidence 
Note: Only results for variables with statistical significance are included in this table  
although the regression contained other continuous variables and SIC codes. 
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Table VI: Comparative Descriptive Statistics of Significant Results  
 
Variable (1) (3) Without Financial Crisis Data 
Offer Amount 0.000103 
(0.000088) 
0.000101* 
(0.000061) 
Days -0.000016* 
(9.05e-06) 
-- 
SIC* Foreign   
27590000 1 0.09551*** 
(0.015181) 
0.10397*** 
(0.011774) 
28210000 1 0.26703*** 
(0.050187) 
0.28096*** 
(0.044373) 
35770000 1 -0.33417*** 
(0.127171) 
-0.32963** 
(0.133813) 
36610000 1 -0.40423*** 
(0.082064) 
-0.40140*** 
(0.085712) 
36630000 1 -0.40262*** 
(0.022021) 
-0.38006*** 
(0.012169) 
38230000 1 -0.10844 
(0.071492) 
-0.16633** 
(0.066592) 
38510000 1 -0.06052** 
(0.026025) 
-0.03657* 
(0.017147) 
39490000 1 0.139141*** 
(0.023193) 
0.11596*** 
(0.020668) 
47240000 1 0.943622*** 
(0.046182) 
-- 
48330000 1 0.248431*** 
(0.040432) 
0.23448*** 
(0.025818) 
48990000 1 0.187196** 
(0.075458) 
0.18841*** 
(0.072039) 
49410000 1 -0.46348*** 
(0.074203) 
-- 
51710000 1 0.121028* 
(0.066738) 
0.15624** 
(0.071258) 
55410000 1 -0.30439* 
(0.168932) 
-- 
64110000 1 0.587601*** 
(0.048869) 
-- 
70110000 1 0.208112* 
(0.118975) 
0.28714** 
(0.145733) 
73750000 1 0.657553*** 
(0.125901) 
0.59132*** 
(0.113971) 
 
  
Constant 0.255845 
(0.347710) 
0.08463 
(0.106305) 
Observations 312 256 
R2 0.3506 0.3377 
 
*** denotes 1% confidence, ** denotes 5% confidence, * denotes 10% confidence 
Note: Only results for variables with statistical significance are included in this table  
although the regression contained other continuous variables and SIC codes. 
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Table VII: Descriptive Statistics, Regression (1) 
 
Variable (1)    
OFFERA 
0.000103 
(8.76E-05) 
 
SIC (Continued)  
SALES 
5.14E-06 
(2.92E-05) 
 
73890000 
0.112387 
(0.15433) 
EMP 
2.77E-06 
(6.58E-06) 
 
82990000 
0.115064 
(0.076396) 
OVERH 
-0.05742 
(0.079576) 
 
SIC*FOREIGN  
TOP 
0.016669 
(0.018223) 
 
13820000 1 
-0.0772 
(0.061394) 
DAYS 
-1.2E-05 
(2.01E-05) 
 
20850000 1 
-0.01101 
(0.029602) 
DATE 
-1.6E-05* 
(9.05E-06) 
 
27410000 1 
-0.16183 
(0.100177) 
SIC 
 
27590000 1 
0.095507*** 
(0.015181) 
20850000 
0.001736 
(0.070427) 
 
28210000 1 
0.267028*** 
(0.050187) 
27410000 
0.20356** 
(0.101931) 
 
28340000 1 
-0.03675 
(0.047598) 
27590000 
0.127807*** 
(0.062415) 
 
28360000 1 
0.012679 
(0.041104) 
28210000 
-0.003 
(0.077112) 
 
28990000 1 
0.142857 
(0.090419) 
28340000 
-0.05848 
(0.075096) 
 
35590000 1 
0.143784 
(0.235603) 
28360000 
-0.03645 
(0.079903) 
 
35770000 1 
-0.33417*** 
(0.127171) 
28990000 
-0.15236** 
(0.074041) 
 
36610000 1 
-0.40423*** 
(0.082064) 
35590000 
0.000792 
(0.148034) 
 
36630000 1 
-0.40262*** 
(0.022021) 
35770000 
0.308496*** 
(0.115796) 
 
36740000 1 
-0.00798 
(0.083239) 
36610000 
0.214353** 
(0.103462) 
 
38230000 1 
-0.10844 
(0.071492) 
36630000 
0.269779*** 
(0.071245) 
 
38410000 1 
0.060355 
(0.090922) 
36740000 
0.068055 
(0.07332) 
 
38450000 1 
-0.00084 
(0.161486) 
38230000 
-0.00794 
(0.088529) 
 
38510000 1 
-0.06052** 
(0.026025) 
38410000 
0.078765 
(0.113568 
 
39490000 1 
0.139141*** 
(0.023193) 
38450000 
-0.00872 
(0.08474) 
 
44120000 1 
0.022369 
(0.036864) 
38510000 
0.146217** 
(0.073161) 
 
45120000 1 
0.05249 
(0.129312) 
39490000 
0.333772*** 
(0.067048) 
 
47240000 1 
0.943622*** 
(0.046182) 
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44120000 
-0.0401 
(0.075379) 
 
48120000 1 
-0.03957 
(0.060167) 
45120000 
0.089895 
(0.140074) 
 
48130000 1 
-0.0523 
(0.118872) 
47240000 
-0.09322 
(0.067825) 
 
48330000 1 
0.248431*** 
(0.040432) 
48120000 
-0.04919 
(0.074077) 
 
48990000 1 
0.187196** 
(0.075458) 
48130000 
-0.00641 
(0.134156) 
 
49410000 1 
-0.46348*** 
(0.074203) 
48330000 
-0.11018 
(0.075745) 
 
51710000 1 
0.121028* 
(0.066738) 
48990000 
-0.02509 
(0.097292) 
 
55410000 1 
-0.30439* 
(0.168932) 
49410000 
0.451759*** 
(0.067968) 
 
55990000 1 
0.028531 
(0.077906) 
51710000 
-0.02279 
(0.06757) 
 
58120000 1 
0.131658 
(0.20644) 
55410000 
0.028797 
(0.072913) 
 
59120000 1 
-0.06072 
(0.091203) 
55990000 
-0.00985 
(0.101103) 
 
64110000 1 
0.587601*** 
(0.048869) 
58120000 
0.138174 
(0.126044) 
 
65310000 1 
0.101166 
(0.226836) 
59120000 
-0.00212 
(0.08897) 
 
67260000 1 
0.126185 
(0.177884) 
ok64110000 
-0.05731 
(0.081969) 
 
70110000 1 
0.208112* 
(0.118975) 
65310000 
-0.00217 
(0.199725) 
 
73120000 1 
0.027294 
(0.068749) 
67260000 
0.015016 
(0.078933) 
 
73710000 1 
0.180385 
(0.166595) 
70110000 
-0.11564 
(0.172699) 
 
73720000 1 
-0.02667 
(0.171288) 
73120000 
-0.10087 
(0.076719) 
 
73750000 1 
0.657553*** 
(0.125901) 
73710000 
0.016401 
(0.090693) 
 
73890000 1 
0.029441 
(0.258206) 
73720000 
0.045364 
(0.098739) 
 
82990000 1 
0.043318 
(0.154813) 
73750000 
0.024912 
(0.150573) 
 
89990000 1 
0.41346 
(0.757381) 
(Results continued again at top) 
 
CONSTANT 
0.255845 
(0.347711) 
 
*** denotes 1% confidence, ** denotes 5% confidence, * denotes 10% confidence 
 
 
 
